Thursday, June 11, 2009

Is the Golden Rule a Good Guide to Moral Action?

“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” (Gert 1). Many people think that the Golden Rule serves as a good principle by which to live one’s life. This fundamental rule appeals directly to the common sense notion expressed by most people, that a given course of action should only be pursued by an individual if that same individual would be satisfied by the consequences of that same action if it were performed by another agent. In order to apply the Golden Rule properly, an agent must imagine himself to be in the exact position of the person on the receiving end of the action. If this agent acts in a given way towards this other person, and yet is ultimately unwilling to be treated in the same manner under the same circumstances, then he has violated the rule (Gensler 1). From an intuitive perspective, it seems inherently wrong and hypocritical to actively violate this maxim under normal circumstances, since doing so would effectively serve to give a disproportionate amount of weight to one agent’s interests at the expense of all others. If an agent decides to violate the Golden Rule, then he violates the fundamental notion of fairness as well which serves as the centerpiece of morality itself. Therefore, due to the belief that the Golden Rule coheres well with our intuitive notions of the morally right and morally wrong, for many centuries it has been very influential among people of diverse cultures, ethnicities, and religions. The Golden Rule has taken on significant normative force as a result of the fact that it has been endorsed by all of the major world religions. “Jesus, Hillel, and Confucius used it (The Golden Rule) to summarize their ethical teachings” (Gensler 1). The enormous clout of organized religion has served to supplement the perceived moral legitimacy of living one’s life according to the demands of the Golden Rule. Thus, a great proportion of the world’s population, especially those who affiliate themselves with organized religion, consider the Golden Rule to constitute an infallible guide to moral action, which can never justifiably be violated in pursuance of one’s interests and preferences. 

While at first look the Golden Rule may appear to be the most legitimate and authoritative moral rule in existence in the contemporary world, upon further examination it becomes apparent that the Golden Rule does not always serve as a reliable guide to moral action. As will be discussed later, in certain cases the Golden Rule seems to require conduct that most people admit should not be considered mandatory, and in other situations it seems to require conduct which clearly appears to be wrong. For example, if followed literally, the Golden Rule would preclude all policemen from apprehending criminals. Assuming that policemen do not want to be caught and sentenced to prison themselves, according to the text of the Golden Rule, it follows that they ought not to arrest and sentence others (Gert 2). This illustration shows that if interpreted literally, the Golden Rule is useless insofar as it is intended to reliably tell people what they ought to do. However, it does not follow from this weakness that we should abandon the consideration of the Golden Rule during our moral deliberations altogether: rather, we should modify it in order to increase its practicality and moral clout. Thus, instead of being viewed as an absolute moral command which permits no exceptions and provides us with indisputable answers to all moral questions, the Golden Rule should be viewed as a consistency principle, which reminds us not to place consequences on others which we would be unwilling to bear ourselves if the situation were reversed. 

Utilitarianism and the Golden Rule

From a utilitarian perspective, the Golden Rule is considered to be an essential guide to moral action. Under a utilitarianism system of morality, an act is right if and only if it leads to the greatest aggregate amount of well being (Kagan 61). Doing unto others only those things that you would be willing to have them do to you undoubtedly serves to contribute to the general welfare of society. A typical utilitarian would argue that failing to adhere to this demand would serve to undermine the sense of trust felt by an individual agent towards the rest of society, by invoking the feeling that the agent has been taken advantage of by others in the pursuance of their personal interests. Although the impact of a single agent failing to adhere to the maxim would not produce a significant tangible effect on the total utility, if similarly situated persons followed this precedent and continuously ignored the Golden Rule, the ultimate result would likely be the undermining of many societal conventions founded on the trust of your fellow man. For example, the perpetual ignorance of the Golden Rule could potentially lead to a society in which contracts are effectively left meaningless, due to the fact that individual agents would only pursue courses of actions which serve to maximize their personal, as opposed to the collective, well being. Thus, the Golden Rule can be viewed as a foundational block which is necessary to justify any utilitarian system of morality. 

Substantial evidence for this view is provided by John Stuart Mill in his book Utilitarianism. “Jesus’ golden rule, he says, expresses ‘the complete spirit of the ethics of utility’” (Wattles 9). Mill articulates that the Golden Rule and utilitarian morality are not disparate concepts which should be confined to distinct realms, but rather should be viewed as linked together. It can be implied from this statement that Mill considered the Golden Rule to constitute an underlying condition which was necessary for the promulgation of utilitarianism itself. In other words, utilitarian morality, at least in the sense conceived of by Mill, is effectively a quantified extension of the principle of doing unto others only what you would have them do unto you. Mill appeals to the Golden Rule in his book in order to defend utilitarianism from a commonly articulated criticism: that the ultimate happiness desired by proponents of utilitarianism is not the happiness of the individual but rather the happiness of the collective society of which each individual is a part (South 1). Thus, critics charge that utilitarianism is misguided insofar as it unreasonably requires individual agents to act in ways calculated to advance the good of others. However, Mill easily refutes this criticism by referring to the Golden Rule. Under this rule, individuals are presented with the responsibility to promote the interests of society as a whole to an extent above and beyond those of an individual nature. Therefore, so long as the Golden Rule is considered to be a recognized moral rule, this criticism holds no weight since it is by no means unreasonable to expect individual agents to fulfill such an outward-directed responsibility. “In fact, Mill considers this rule the ‘ideal perfection of utilitarian morality,’ to which every functional member of society should aspire” (South 1). According to Mill, a utilitarian system of morality would be incomplete if it failed to take into account the requirements of the Golden Rule. Therefore, Mill’s forumulation of utilitarianism implies that the Golden Rule and the Greastest Happiness Principle are intertwined, and that the failure of individual agents to abide by this maxim would likely serve to undermine the greatest happiness for the greatest number.   

Furthermore, proponents of more contemporary utilitarian theories of morality would attempt to justify the Golden Rule as well. For example, the Golden Rule would still fit well in R.M. Hare’s indirect split-level account of act utilitarianism. Hare’s conception of utilitarianism distinguishes between two levels of moral thinking, the critical level and the intuitive level. According to this method, act-utilitarian thinking is only undertaken at the more abstract critical level, and then is subsequently used at the more practical intuitive level in order to select those guides by which to conduct one’s life (Frey 169). This modified version of traditional act-utilitarianism removes the common criticism that utilitarianism unreasonably compels individual agents to conduct complex well being maximization calculations at the immediate level of decision making. “The main effect of this distinction of levels is, at the level of practice, to make Hare’s theory only indirectly consequentialist, since it bars any extensive appeal to an act’s consequences at the intuitive level” (Frey 169). In other words, under Hare’s forumulation of utilitarianism, an agent is not required to appeal directly to the principle of utility at the immediate judgment level in every given scenario. Instead, the only demand imposed on an agent by this theory at the practical level is for him to select those guides, by applying the knowledge previously obtained by thinking in theoretical terms at the critical level, whose acceptance will maximize well being. 

Furthermore, Hare articulates that the goal at the critical level of moral deliberation is to devise and promulgate relatively simple and easily understandable principles, which can subsequently be applied to guide an agent’s decisions at the practical level. Complex rules containing numerous unless clauses will not be of much use at the critical or practical levels, due to the fact that it is unlikely that they will be properly understood by the majority of society. If these rules are not comprehended by the general population, then it is highly unlikely that they will serve as successful guides to action. “Which rules we have at the intuitive level is a function of their acceptance-utility, and Hare includes under this the cost versus the benefits of making the rules part of our character. We need simple rules which do not grow too complicated and so are easy to forumulate, teach, and learn” (Frey 170). The Golden Rule undoubtedly fits very well into Hare’s split-level utilitarian approach. Due to its relative simplicity and global appeal, the Golden Rule can be easily understood and applied by citizens of disparate societies around the world. Hare would argue that this rule is justifiable on account of the fact that unlike many other more complex moral rules, the Golden Rule has the potential to actually be applied by individual agents during their moral deliberations. Thus, it follows from this that the Golden Rule has a greater potential to maximize human well being than many other moral rules, since it can be successfully followed by the average person and not just by those who consider themselves to be experts in moral theory. 

Furthermore, the Golden Rule can be justified from a rule-utilitarian perspective as well. For example, in his article Some Merits of One Form of Rule-Utilitarianism, Richard Brandt argues that utilitarian agents should appeal not to the principle of utility in every given situation, but rather to general rules derived from that principle. Brandt states that moral character of a given act is based on whether or not it adheres to the ideal moral code. “An act is right if and only if it would not be prohibited by the moral code ideal for the society; and an agent is morally blameworthy (praiseworthy) for an act, if and to the degree that, the moral code ideal in that society would condemn (praise) him for it” (Brandt 425). In order to determine if a given action falls under the moral code, Brandt asserts that we must analyze whether or not the action in question falls under that category of actions generally approved of by the agent’s community (Brandt 421). Therefore, it is clear that living one’s life according to the Golden Rule, at least under most circumstances, should be included in such an ideal moral code. Due to the fact that the Golden Rule is universally held to be in high esteem, it would be difficult if not altogether impossible to find a community in which the demands of the Golden Rule are looked down upon with scorn. It has essentially become a generally acceptal societal notion that the overall happiness is substantially supplemented when people do unto others only those things that they would have others do unto themselves. Thus, it is apparent that if Brandt’s formulation of the ideal moral code is to carry any weight across diverse cultures and societies, the Golden Rule must be included in it.       

Deontology and the Golden Rule

The Golden Rule can be justified by deontological approaches to morality as well. For example, Immanuel Kant’s forumulation of categorical imperatives in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals can be shown to support the obligation to live one’s life according to the Golden Rule. Kant argues that moral agents ought to abide by certain moral rules. He asserts that personal desires and interests do not represent a legitimate justification for moral action. Instead, Kant states that the fundamental principle underlying our moral duties is the categorical imperative. “Categorical imperatives then seem like demands that we must obey with the attitude of a dutiful soldier following orders, respecting the authority of law without regard to anything else” (Hill 235). According to Kant, categorical imperatives command us to act in a certain way, regardless of the external circumstances. For example, suppose that after the conclusion of a dinner party at your house, you realize that one of your guests has left behind her jacket. In addition, assume that the previous day you went to the store in order to buy the very same jacket, but unfortunately they were sold out. Although you may strongly desire to keep the jacket as your own, Kant would urge you to return the jacket to its rightful owner. Kant would justify this decision by arguing that a you (being a rational agent) should realize that although you desire to own the jacket, this desire is clearly outweighed by the categorical imperative to respect one’s personal property. Thus, categorical imperatives can not be ignored in favor of one’s desire to pursue their personal interests. 

These imperatives effectively represent the most important reason for a given agent to do or refrain from doing a given act. Furthermore, categorical imperatives apply to us unconditionally: they do not only apply on the condition that we have previously adopted some goal for ourselves (Johnson 4). In other words, categorical imperatives must be applied to our actions simply on account of the fact that we possess rational wills. On the other hand, categorical imperatives do not constitute the only source of our moral duties. In addition, in certain cases we possess other moral duties as well, which do not apply to us simply in virtue of the fact that we possess rational wills. Instead, these hypothetical imperatives are conditioned on external circumstances as well (Johnson 4).     

With regard to the Golden Rule, Kant would likely argue that the command to do unto others only that which you would have them do unto you, constitutes a categorical imperative in and of itself. Sunstantial evidence for this assertion is provided by the fact that Kant placed a special emphasis on the notion that ought implies can. In other words, you can not have a duty (at least an actual duty) to do something which is impossible for you to carry out. “Since being under an imperative implies the possibility of acting against reason, agents subject to categorical imperatives may in fact fail to follow them, and may even act against them; but insofar as we suppose the agents ought to follow the imperatives, we must assume that they can” (Hill 241). It is clear that the Golden Rule easily satisfies Kant’s ought implies can requirement for the assignment of moral duties. The Golden Rule has served to influence the actions of a great proportion of the world’s population, from the time of the founding of the major religions themselves all the way up to the present day. Its ability to be comprehended and interpreted easily has undoubtedly served to supplement the cross-cultural appeal of the Golden Rule. The history of the Golden Rule’s applicability demonstrates that placing its obligations on individual moral agents is by no means an unreasonable demand. Therefore, it is apparent that due to its understandability and universality, the Golden Rule can certainly be applied by moral agents residing in disparate regions of the world. 

Furthermore, Kant would consider the Golden Rule to be a categorical imperative, rather than one of a hypothetical nature, due to the fact that it does not serve as a mere means for an agent to get what he wants. Instead, it would be rational to follow the rule as an end in and of itself. “Making us happy and helping us get what we want is not what makes moral principles categorical imperatives; they are rational to follow, even if doing so does not make us happy or promote our personal ends” (Hill 236). It is ultimately irrelevant whether or not abiding by the Golden Rule serves to increase an individual agent’s utility: rather, it still must be adhered to by virtue of the fact that it is effectively commanded by rational deliberation. It can also be argued that Kant would classify the Golden Rule as a categorical imperative on account of the fact that it provides us with an overriding reason to act. “As Kant uses the term, categorical imperatives do not merely say that we have to have some reason to do what they prescribe. They assert that we have sufficient reason, overriding other considerations” (Hill 236). According to Kant, an essential characteristic of a categorical imperative is that it provides us with sufficient reasons to act. Especially among people of strong religious beliefs, the Golden Rule may well be considered as a sufficient cause to pursue a given course of action. 

For example, assume that Jim, an upper level manager at a lucrative hedge fund company, has just received a substantial Christmas bonus. Due to the fact that he is an avid car collector, Jim plans to purchase a brand new BMW with his additional capital. However, right before he is about to go out to purchase the new car, Jim sees an advertisement urging people to look in their hearts and donate money to help suffering children in Darfur. Being a religious man, Jim believes that he is obligated to donate the money. In this instance, the Golden Rule would urge Jim to place himself in the situation of the suffering children, and thus to donate the money in order to preclude them from starving to death. Although Jim personally desires to put the money towards a new car, he recognizes that the Golden Rule by itself presents him with a sufficient reason to help the children. Therefore, it is clear that in situations such as the one presented above, the Golden Rule is equivalent to a categorical imperative, in the sense that it serves as the overriding consideration that ultimately determines Jim’s decision. Although Jim may have a substantial interest in pursuing his personal project of collecting cars, the call to action based on this project is not nearly as strong as that presented by the categorical imperative. Thus, this illustration is very revealing insofar as it exemplifies that even personal projects must be abandoned when they come into conflict with a categorical imperative.

Furthermore, Kant is by no means the only deonotologist who would attempt to justify the morality of the Golden Rule. In his article What Makes Right Acts Right, W.D. Ross places a special emphasis on the concept of prima facie duties. According to Ross, although these duties are fundamental and do not require justification, they do not rest entirely in our intuitions. 

That an act is prima facie right is self-evident; not in the sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself (Ross 95).             


Ross articulates that the acknowledgement of these duties comes about not merely through being born, but instead through a rational deliberative process. Ross defines a prima facie duty as one which is incumbent on an agent based on the circumstances of each individual case (Ross 89). In other words, it is useful to think of these duties as standing moral responsibilities (this term better expresses what Ross meant by prima facie duties), which are basically responsibilities of an ongoing nature that are triggered by specific circumstances. Acting consistently with these duties is intrinsically right, regardless of the consequences that may result. Therefore, Ross’ approach to morality is easily distinguished from utilitarian approaches, due to the fact that Ross considers the promotion of aggregate well being to constitute only one of these competing fundamental duties. 

Under Ross’ deontological theory, the Golden Rule can be justified in two distinct ways. For one, it can be argued that adhering to the Golden Rule itself constitutes a prima facie duty. As justification for this classification, it can be asserted that abiding by the Golden Rule seems to be intrinsically right, as shown by the beneficial results that it has produced for humanity since its original forumulation. However, it can be argued that this classification is ultimately arbitrary, due to the fact that we have not provided much in terms of a substantial justification for it. Why must we, prima facie, simply assume that it is right to adhere to the Golden Rule, without first being presented with any tangible evidence to justify this assertion? 

A better approach from Ross’ perspective would be not to label the Golden Rule as a prima facie duty, but rather to articulate that one’s adherance to the Golden Rule serves as a means to promote other, more concrete prima facie duties. For example, it could be argued that the Golden Rule serves to promote the deontological responsibilities of promoting gratitude and justice. According to Ross, duties of gratitude rest upon the previous acts of other men (Ross 90). The Golden Rule undoubtedly promotes this duty since the command for me to do unto others only that which I would have them do to me, rests on the fact that others have provided beneficial services to me. In order to promote the duty of gratitute, it is necessary for me to return the favor, by only treating you in a manner identical to that in which I would prefer to be treated as well. With regard to the duty to promote justice, Ross states that we have a duty to prevent the wrongful and unequitable distribution of happiness. “Some rest on the fact or distribution of pleasure or happiness which is not in accordance with the merit of the persons concerned” (Ross 90). The Golden Rule would promote the duty of justice through its implication that those who adhere to its terms and treat people in a caring, respectful manner, deserve to be treated in the same way as well. It can be argued that the universal acceptance of the Golden Rule would contribute to the most just distribution of pleasure and happiness, by allocating significant benefits to those would live their lives by the rule’s demands. In other words, those who strictly obey the rule would receive benefits superior to those received by those who ignore the rule. Therefore, it is apparent that the Golden Rule would promote justice’s emphasis on merit, by according greater benefits to those who abide by its terms. Thus, we can conclude from this discussion that deontological approaches to ethical theory would provide strong support for the Golden Rule. 

Contractarianism and the Golden Rule

Furthermore, contractarian theorists would strongly support the Golden Rule as well. However, the justifications offered by these theorists would substantially differ from those put forth by utilitarian and deontological theorists. Contractarianism is primarily dervied from Thomas Hobbes’ social contract political theory. Hobbes believed that the fundamental justification that a state has for imposing its laws upon its citizens stems from a tacit agreement made between those citizens and the state (Cudd 1). Within this agreement, the citizens tranfer a portion of their authority to the state, in exchange for the promise of security and the maintenance of peace and order. Hobbes argued that this arrangement would be beneficial for the citizens on account of the fact that it would effectively remove them from the state of nature. Although the people did possess unlimited rights in this unrestricted state, this state was ultimately chaotic. 

And because the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another’s body. And, therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live (Hobbes 14).


In discussing the state of nature, Hobbes articulated that if an individual chose to live in a nation without any form of government, he would be choosing to live in a state of perpetual fear. The fundamental notions of right and wrong, and just and unjust, cease to exist in such a state due to the fact that no institutions have been endowed with the authority to enforce these principles. Although Hobbes stated that men living in the state of nature do seek to obtain peace, it is ultimately impossible for them to obtain it in this unrestricted state (Hobbes 14). Thus, it is rational for men to enter into a contract with their government, in exchange for the promise of peace. 

Building on Hobbes’ forumulation of this political theory, ethical contractarians argue that moral legitimacy presupposes the consent of the governed. “What binds the tradition together, in the face of this variety, is the conviction that moral norms or political institutions find legitimacy, when they do, in their ability to secure the agreement of those to whom they apply” (Sayre-McCord 247). This approach can be interpreted as asserting that authority should be derived from the bottom up, instead of from the top down. One of the most popular contemporary accounts of contractarianism was put forth by John Rawls, in his 1971 book A Theory of Justice. Rawls attemps to forumulate an alternative theory to utilitarianism, which considers “seriously the distinction between persons” (Sayre-McCord). Rawls criticizes utilitarian approaches to morality due to the fact that they serve to abstract from the individual, and downplay the significance of individual circumstances. Rawls argues that the demand of impartiality should still be taken into account, but in a different way than it is used by utilitarian theorists. Rawls states that the proper way to apply impartiality is through permitting people to choose principles to govern everyone’s behavior. However, this choice should only be made under circumstances in which these individuals are unaware of their positions in society. “Rawls describes the appropriate circumstances of agreement- the relevant ‘state of nature’- as including a ‘veil of ignorance’ that shield from view all information concerning the particular talents, tastes, history and situation of those seeking agreement” (Sayre-McCord 255). Rawls implies that impartiality can be successfully achieved by removing all partial information from the deliberative process. Under these hypothetical circumstances, rational agents would gather together to choose moral principles to govern the world, without the usual impact of outside influences. The primary advantage of Rawls’ procedure for selecting moral principles is that it increases the probability that the accepted principles will be ones which promote fairness. For example, due to the fact that none of these ignorant agents would want to be disadvantaged if it later turned out that they happened to be a member of a racial minority, they would refrain from adopting principles which promote discrimination.  

Rawls’ formulation of the “veil of ignorance” provides a conducive environment for the acceptance of the Golden Rule as a binding moral principle. The command to do unto others only what you would have them do unto you, would clearly be beneficial to promulgate from the perspective of an individual behind the “veil of ignorance.” If this command were adhered to in a literal sense, it would promote the general sense of trust among members of society and would even serve to supplement the legitimacy of public institutions, such as binding contracts. At least for the majority of society, it is apparent that the Golden Rule would be a beneficial moral principle. Furthermore, since individual agents are not aware of their societal positions behind the “veil of ignorance,” it would be safe for each of them to assume that they will fall somewhere in the middle of the societal hierarchy, and thus will serve to benefit from the promulgation of the rule. Thus, it would be rational for self interested agents to support the Golden Rule during these deliberations in order to promote their personal well being. In fact, the only instance in which it would not be rational for an agent to support the Golden Rule would be a situation in which an agent is aware of his exact position in society, and further knows that strict adherance to this rule would not always be to his advantage. However, Rawls’ conception of contractarianism removes this possibility from consideration, since agents are not aware of their personal positions from behind the “veil of ignorance.” Thus, at least as long as the “veil of ignorance” is not undermined during the course of the deliberations, we can be confident that one of the moral principles to emerge from these deliberations would be the Golden Rule. 

Additional support for the Golden Rule is provided by Rawls’ assertion that self interested rational persons behind the “veil of ignorance” would choose to adopt a general principle of justice: the Principle of Equal Liberty. This principle states that each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all (Cudd 3). The promulgation of the Golden Rule would serve to advance this principle, by ensuring that each person respects the fundamental rights of every other person. Applied to the concept of rights, the Golden Rule demands that if I want to maintain and exercise my rights, I must refrain from violating those of my neighbor. For example, if I strongly believe in my personal right to privacy, it would be wrong of me to sneak into my neighbor’s house without prior permission. Therefore, it is apparent that the acceptance of the Golden Rule would facilitate Rawls’ goal of promoting the principle of equal rights for all persons. 

Furthermore, David Gauthier’s article Why Contractarianism? provides another contractarian source of support for the Golden Rule. Gauthier argues that morality itself faces a foundational crisis, which can only be overcome through understanding and applying the concept of mutual cooperation. Gauthier asserts that if all moral agents agreed to accept reasonable constraints, this would ultimately lead to higher overall utility. “No one, of course, can have reason to accept any unilateral constraint of her maximizing behavior; each benefits from, and only from, the constraint accepted by her fellows. But if one benefits more from a constraint on others than one loses by being constrained oneself, one may have reason to accept a practice requiring everyone, including oneself, to exhibit such a constraint” (Gauthier 707). It is apparent that at least under certain circumstances, it would be rational for an agent to accept a restriction on her actions, due to the fact that a contrained agent would likely receive more favorable opportunities than another who refuses to accept the constraint. Under this conception of contractarianism, it can be argued that the Golden Rule would be strongly justified. Although the Golden Rule serves to constrain an agent’s actions at least to some degree, on balance it is apparent that the acceptance of this minor restriction is easily outweighed by the potential benefits which could be expected in the future. The universal acceptance of the Golden Rule would be mutually beneficial, in that it would promote the notion of trust throughout society. It follows from the promotion of trust that several additional tangible benefits would be created as well. These would include the legitimacy of contracts, the protection and respect of individual rights, and several others. Thus, it is clear that although the acceptance of the Golden Rule may impose a slight constraint on individual autonomy, it would nevertheless be justified under Gauthier’s theory due to the significant beneficial effects that it would produce.  

Is the Golden Rule Really as Reliable as Many Philosophers Would Have us Believe?

As the previous discussion has shown, the Golden Rule is not only appealed to under a single conception of morality, but rather can be justified by utilitarian, deontological, and contractarian approaches to morality. Although the Golden Rule is generally well suited to be a standard to which members of different cultures could appeal in order to guide their moral deliberations, upon further examination it is apparent that this rule is not infallible. At least in its literal formulation, the Golden Rule does not always serve as a reliable guide to moral action. In certain circumstances, the Golden Rule would obligate us to pursue unacceptable courses of action. For example, suppose that I want to steal my neighbor’s new car. When deliberating whether or not I should do this, the Golden Rule requires me to place myself in the situation of my neighbor, and ask myself would I allow my neighbor to do this to me? While for the majority of people the answer to this question would be no, assume that I am misguided and thus answer yes. Would the Golden Rule, interpreted in its literal sense, prohibit me from stealing my neighbor’s car? 

Under these circumstances, the Golden Rule actually would not forbid me from attempting to steal my neighbor’s car. This illustration is especially revealing due to the fact that it exemplifies that the Golden Rule could be used to justify any injury whatsoever, so long as I agree to be treated just as inhumanely as I treat others. “There is no evil it could not be made to justify if only the perpetrator be willing to embrace it when he views himself as victim as well” (Weiss 421). It is clear from this example that at least in certain situations, the Golden Rule can be used to justify vices such as killing, stealing, and lying. Therefore, in order to preclude the Golden Rule from being deprived of all moral value, it must be amended in such a way that this significant defect is overcome. In his article The Golden Rule, Paul Weiss proposes a way to accomplish this. “There is another statement of the rule, ‘Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, do that to them’” (Weiss 421). Weiss argues that this restatement of the Golden Rule overcomes several key difficulties associated with its initial formulation. For example, Weiss asserts that a major problem with the original interpretation of the rule is that an agent about to perform an action is merely asked to consider himself in the role of the patient. Under this interpretation, the Golden Rule is understood to mean that we are to do unto others that which we would be willing to have them do to us. On the other hand, this restatement requires a prospective recipient of benefits to actually perform the role of the agent providing the benefits (Weiss 421). While this interpretation of the rule may represent an improvement, it is by no means free from defects. Even under Weiss’ restatement, the Golden Rule would nevertheless permit the wealthy to disregard the suffering of the poor (Weiss 422). The reason for this is that what is good from the perspective of the wealthy differs substantially from that of the poor. Thus, the Golden Rule can only be applied successfully in situations in which what is good for one group of people is good for all. 

Weiss recognizes this disparity and articulates that it should be considered as a necessary condition for the use of the Golden Rule. In addition, he promulgates two other necessary conditions: we must know exactly what it is that we want, and what we want must be identical with what we ought to desire (Weiss 422). The acceptance of these three conditions rules out the apparent shortcoming that arises when an agent is misguided (such as the example I presented above), and also rules out scenarios in which what is good for one group is not good for others. In situations in which any of these three conditions are not met, we should refrain from appealing to the Golden Rule. Therefore, the use of the Golden Rule guides us toward the morally preferable/obligatory course of action, only when all of these conditions are satisfied.

Weiss’ conditional acceptance of the Golden Rule exemplifies that many of the objections articulated against the use of the rule as a binding moral principle are founded on the belief that appeal to the Golden Rule does not presuppose any prior necessary conditions. For example, going back to the scenario that I presented at the beginning of this paper (regarding the policeman and the criminal), it is apparent that we should refrain from seeking the guidance offered by the Golden Rule since the facts of the situation violate Weiss’ first condition. The Golden Rule clearly does not intend to be applied in such a way as to preclude all policemen from apprehending criminals, and thus it is necessary for us to modify it in order to encompass this reality. “It is a device enabling us to do to others what ought to be done to them; it is a ready means for counteracting a natural tendency to ignore their rights and needs” (Weiss 422). Instead of being viewed as an infallible command which must be applied during every moral controversy, the Golden Rule should instead be considered as a motivation for action, to be applied based on the circumstances of each individual dispute. Just like many other moral rules, the Golden Rule should only be selectively applied: its application in situations in which the three conditions have not been satisfied may serve to produce counterproductive results. Thus, we can conclude that although the Golden Rule may serve to provide us with significant moral guidance especially under Weiss’ modified form, its application must be strictly confined to appropriate situations.                   


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