Suppose that we are confronted with a situation in which a man inflicted with a terminal illness is spending his remaining days in a hospital bed. This man has never explicitly stated his preferences with regard to such a dire situation in a living will, and thus his desires can not reasonably be discerned. Suppose further that the illness suddenly worsens, placing the man into a persistent vegetative state. He no longer has the ability to communicate with other people or even to eat, and he would be unable to breathe without the assistance of life support machines. Furthermore, the man’s doctors maintain that he is currently enduring an extraordinary amount of pain. Seeking to end his suffering, the man’s son appeals to the courts for an injunction that would permit him to remove his father’s life support. After his request is denied, the son decides that the proper course of action is to pull the plug anyway, on the grounds that he is obligated to preclude his father from experiencing any more unnecessary pain. This begs the question, from a moral perspective, was the son right in disobeying the court’s mandate in order to relieve his father’s suffering?
Immediately upon reading this case (prior to engaging in conscious reflection and analysis), you should at least have some inclination as to whether or not you believe that the son’s actions were morally right or morally wrong. Why is this the case? According to one philosophical school of thought, known as moral intuitionism, the answer to this question is that we regularly appeal to our intuitions for moral guidance. Our intuitions allow us to make spontaneous judgments, without engaging in conscious inferential reasoning (McMahan 94). The most adamant adherents of this theory maintain that moral notions of right and wrong can not be accurately explained by appeal to any other concept, except for our moral intuitions. The intuitionists further assert that these intuitions arise spontaneously, and are derived from an internal moral faculty. “Intuitions are the deliverances of a special organ or faculty of moral perception, typically understood as something like an inner eye that provides occult access to noumenal realm of objective values” (McMahan 94). According to many intuitionists, this moral faculty provides us with a method by which to innately distinguish the morally right from the morally wrong. As G.E. Moore contends, this faculty allows us to distinguish good from all other ethical properties (Moore 20). Although our moral intuitions may serve as a good starting point from which to construct a moral theory distinguishing between the right and the wrong, they are by no means the only factor which needs to be considered in developing such a theory. Instead, if seeking to develop a moral theory which can successfully contribute to the resolution of contemporary substantive debates, a philosopher must account for a variety of factors in addition to our moral intuitions. Contrary to the assertions of intuitionists such as G.E. Moore and H.A. Prichard, our moral intuitions are not infallible, and thus should not be used as the sole criterion from which to judge the moral value of a particular course of action.
H.A. Prichard: A Defense of Intuitionism
In his article, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, H.A. Prichard attempts to defend moral intuitionism. Prichard is primarily concerned with chastising previous philosophers for providing unsatisfactory answers to the Moral Question, of why person A ought to do act y. According to Prichard, this question has been answered in two forms. The first is that person A ought to do act y because doing so will be for his own good (Prichard 38). The second response is that person A ought to do act y because something realized either in or by the action is good (Prichard 38). With regard to the first response, Prichard argues that this answer is irrelevant because it effectively changes the question itself. Rather than focusing on our moral obligations, this answer only influences us to want to keep our engagements. However, the reason why the concept of moral obligation was introduced in the first place was because certain actions run counter to our inclinations, and yet still should be performed (Schwarz 170). Thus, this answer effectively reduces our moral obligations to inclinations (Prichard 39). With regard to the second response, Prichard distinguishes between two forms of the answer. The Utilitarianism form states that a good consequence will result from doing a given action. “It contends that if something which is not an action is good, then we ought to undertake the action which will, directly or indirectly, originate it” (Prichard 39). In other words, Prichard interprets this response to mean that person A ought to do x because it will in turn lead to y, which we already know will bring about good consequences. Prichard criticizes this response by articulating that an “ought” can only be derived from another “ought,” and that this word can be applied only to actions (Prichard 39). For this “because” relationship to be considered valid, we must suppose that y “ought” to be. However, if we suppose that y ought to be, then this would be incorrect due to the fact that y does not directly refer to an action, but rather to favorable consequences stemming from another action.
The second form of this answer states that an act’s intrinsic goodness serves as the justification for why the act should be done (Prichard 40). However, Prichard asserts that this response is contradictory, due to the fact that it refers to the motive out of which an action is done, but obligation can not be based on motives alone. Prichard concludes from this discussion that since these are the only two ways in ways the Moral Question can be answered, it can not be answered in any reasonable way. The question itself is erroneous, due to the fact that it requires an appeal to reason, although legitimate reasons can not be given to support the answer. If this question is not able to be answered in this way, then what is the true nature of the difficulty of resolving the Moral Question?
According to Prichard, the primary reason why this question can not be answered is that this sense of moral obligation is self-evident. “The sense of obligation to do, or of the rightness of, an action of a particular kind is absolutely underivative or immediate” (Prichard 41). Prichard articulates that our notions of moral obligation are derived entirely from our intuitions. This moral apprehension is immediate, as opposed to a conscious process. In order to clarify this assertion, Prichard compares intuitionism to a mathematical apprehension. He notes that just as we inherently and immediately understand that a three-sided figure must have three angles, this apprehension is nearly identical to that of thinking about moral obligations (Prichard 42). Just as it is unnecessary for us to spend time proving that a three-sided figure has three angles, it follows that it is also unnecessary to prove why a person holds a specific fundamental moral belief.
“We then want to have it proved to us that we ought to do so, i.e. to be convinced of this by a process which, as an argument, is different in kind from our original and unreflective appreciation of it. This demand is, as I have argued, illegitimate” (Prichard 47). Prichard asserts that it is essentially irrational for us to believe that we must obtain a special knowledge in order to satisfy this demand for reasoned justification. The fact remains that this knowledge does not exist. Contrary to the arguments advanced by the utilitarians, we can not explain these moral beliefs in terms of the good or virtue: instead, they can only be justified in and of themselves. In other words, our intuitions are the basic buildings blocks upon which the rest of moral theory is constructed. Nothing is more fundamental than these basic moral facts derived directly from our intuitions. According to Prichard, these foundational blocks are permanent and can never be modified in any way (Prichard 42). It can be inferred from this statement that Prichard believes that our intuitions are very reliable and effectively infallible. Therefore, Prichard places an extraordinary amount of confidence in the ability of moral intuitions to correctly guide our actions, and thus he considers our intuitions to constitute the only relevant factor necessary to justify a substantive moral viewpoint.
Are Intuitions Really as Important and Reliable as Prichard Asserts?
Although Prichard’s perspective of placing moral intuitions on a pedestal may appear extreme, it has received independent support from the arguments put forth by other philosophers. For example, in his article Moral Relativity and Intuitionism, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong agrees with Prichard that a person can be justified in holding a specific moral belief without appealing to a more fundamental reason or principle. “If a believer can work back to a premise that the believer is justified in believing without being able to infer that premise from anything else, then there is no new premise to justify, so the regress goes no further” (Sinnott-Armstrong 306). Sinnott-Armstrong articulates that moral beliefs derived from our intuitions are of a fundamental nature, and thus are self-justifying. It is not necessary to infer these beliefs from other beliefs, as exemplified by the fact that they are fundamental. Therefore, those philosophers who emphasize empirical justification for our beliefs are misguided, due to the fact that moral characteristics are inherently non-empirical. As P.F. Strawson articulates through his fictional character North, awareness of moral characteristics is neither sensory nor introspectual: rather, it is a wholly different kind of awareness, which is derived from our intuitions (Strawson 190). It follows from this realization that empirical analysis is not well-suited to scrutinizing the underlying justifications for our moral beliefs.
On the other hand, several specific criticisms can be raised in order to undermine the line of reasoning advanced by Prichard, and more general questions can be raised against intuitionism as a whole. I will begin my criticism by attempting to repudiate sections of Prichard’s argument. For one, Prichard’s refutation of the second answer to the Moral Question rests on unconvincing arguments. While Prichard attempts to argue that utility does not constitute a valid reason why a person ought to perform his duty, his argument ultimately fails in this ragard. Therefore, since he fails to establish this fact, it appears that there may be another reason why (in addition to intuitionism) one ought to perform their duty. Prichard rejects the relevance of the principle of utility to the current debate by stating that if an obligation to do x rests on the fact that x leads to a certain y, then an intermediate link is assumed (Schwarz 175). In order for this link to work, we presuppose that y “ought” to be. It follows from this fact that since an “ought” can only be derived from another “ought,” and this is not the situation in the case at hand, the entire argument fails (Prichard 39). Prichard is incorrect in asserting that an “ought” can only be derived from another “ought.” According to H.D. Aiken, while logically speaking an ethical conclusion can not be deduced from purely factual premises, it still can be inferred. “Now I agree once and for all that there are no logical rules by means of which one can deduce the ethical proposition ‘X ought to be done’ from any combination of purely factual statements. What I do maintain is that, according to ordinary usage, it is entirely permissible to infer ethical conclusions from factual premises” (Schwarz 175). Aiken asserts that we may properly elucidate moral judgments by saying they are established by arguments consisting of factual judgments. Thus, Prichard is mistaken to assume that formal deduction is the only valid form of reasoning from premises to a conclusion (Schwarz 175).
Even if we are presented with a situation in which “ought” conclusion y does presuppose an “ought” premise x, Prichard would hold that it is nevertheless impossible to have a premise in the form of y ought to be, if y itself does not represent an actual action.
The word ‘ought’ refers to action and to action alone. The proper language is never “So and so ought to be,” but “I ought to do so and so.” Even if we are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it ought to be, what we really mean is that God or some human being has not made something what he ought to have made it (Prichard 41).
Prichard’s argument here is vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that he is fundamentally confused about the nature of ought-to-do premises compared with ought-to-be premises. “The reason why we say that someone did not make a thing the way he ought to have made it, is precisely because we first recognize that the thing is not the way it ought to be” (Schwarz 176). Prichard fails to acknowledge the essential connection between these two seemingly disparate types of premises. At least on some occasions, ought-to-do judgments logically presuppose ought-to-be judgments. For example, I ought not to lock my pet dog in a hot car while I go shopping, because my dog should not be subject to pain and suffering. Thus, these two concepts are not mutually exclusive and confined to distinct realms, but are rather meant to be analyzed in conjunction with one another.
It follows from this discussion that Prichard was wrong to assume that we can not legitimately say that y “ought” to be. As an illustration of this, Stephen Schwarz promulgates the example that if a man is drowning it follows that I ought to try and save him because he ought to continue living (Schwarz 176). Although living does not constitute an action according to Prichard’s conception, we ought to consciously pursue courses of action which are favorable to safeguarding human lives, since the state of being alive is undoubtedly good. Thus, Prichard’s line of reasoning does not refute the relevance of the principle of utility to the debate over how to answer the Moral Question. Prichard has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Greatest Happiness Principle is unable to provide an adequate response to the Moral Question. Contrary to the assertions of Prichard, it is apparent that concerns of utility do play an important role in our moral deliberations. Therefore, this fact demonstrates that Prichard’s argument falls apart, since he was ultimately unable to prove that our intuitions alone are the only relevant factor to be considered when attempting to answer the Moral Question.
In addition to the refutation of Prichard’s argument, several more general criticisms can be raised against intuitionism as a whole. For example, it could be argued that this school of thought provides no criterion by which to judge whether or not the assertions put forth by individual philosophers have any real objective value. When challenged to support their view that intuitions are the only relevant moral consideration, the intuitionists respond by simply stating that it is self-evident that intuitions are foundational. This is clearly a subjective value-based judgment. “It can be argued with considerable force that, while the intuitionists are all objectivists in intent, nevertheless they can in fact provide nothing but a subjective basis for their moral pronouncements” (Johnson 193). Due to the fact that the intuitionists hold that our intuitions are of a fundamental nature, they disregard the need to seek independent support for their beliefs. They articulate that people do have direct intuitive insights into objective moral truths which should serve as the basic building blocks for moral theory. However, a significant shortcoming is apparent in this line of reasoning: how can we determine in the first place whether or not an alleged intuition is objectively valid? As Jeff McMahan argues, some of our intuitions may have originated from less than valid sources such as social prejudices (McMahan 95). For example, consider the case of slavery. For the first one hundred years of our Nation’s existence, slavery was ingrained in the minds of the American people as an acceptable social institution. Most Americans during this period of time did not even give a second thought to the matter of the mistreatment of their fellow humans. On the other hand, today the average person is appalled by the mere mention of the notion of slavery.
This case is revealing for two reasons. First, it exemplifies that over a period of time, prejudices accepted by our surrounding social environment may serve to influence our personal notions of right and wrong. Thus, our intuitions are not immune from the external influences of our surrounding cultural, environmental, political, and geographic forces. This fact serves to explain why intuitions vary substantially from culture to culture. One’s upbringing can have an enormous impact on the moral notions espoused by that person later in life. To take a simple example, consider the differences in political expression rights accorded to American and Chinese citizens. American citizens place a special value on freedom of speech, and consider its protection essential to the proper functioning of any acceptable form of government. On the other hand, the Chinese do not consider this right to be nearly as essential as the Americans make it out to be. While this right has been established as one of a fundamental nature within the U.S., this is not the case in China. Therefore, this fundamental cultural difference translates into generations of American and Chinese citizens respectively being raised according to significantly different values. While the right to speak one’s mind freely is taken for granted by most Americans today (and has effectively become grounded in our fundamental notions of right and wrong), the same can not be said about the Chinese. So suppose the leader of a minor opposition party is arrested for allegedly publishing anti-government propaganda. Was the government wrong to pursue this course of action? If we attempt to answer this question by appeal solely to our intuitions, then the answer can be summed up in one word: depends. While many Chinese citizens would consider such an action by their government to be acceptable (although I do concede it could be argued that this is due to their fear of suppression, I assume for the sake of the example that many Chinese citizens do not understand the concept of free speech as we do since it is not ingrained), most Americans would consider such an action to be an egregious removal of constitutionally protected rights. So which group is ultimately right? This difference with regard to a substantive policy issue stems from fundamental differences in values between the two cultures. Therefore, cases such as the one at hand can not be resolved by appealing only to our intuitions.
Second, the slavery case exemplifies that our intuitions change over time. What may be considered an indisputable value during one historical era may be subsequently deemed as unacceptable during the next era. In other words, our fundamental notions of right and wrong are not static, but rather evolve from one generation to the next. You would be hard pressed to find someone today who still literally adheres to the Biblical command of stoning a disloyal son. The fact that our intuitions change over time presents us with another problem: how do we know that the intuitions that we possess at this point in time are more reliable than those which we will possess in the future? Although many slave owners probably considered their judgments based on their intuitions to be infallible at the time, now we all agree that they were in error. What’s to say that a given generation’s sense of morality will never be erroneous again? Thus, contrary to Prichard’s argument, it appears that in some cases our intuitions are misguided and certainly not infallible.
It follows from this discussion that not all intuitions are equal with respect to their normative authority. It is thus meaningless to talk about the reliability of our intuitions in general, since the real issue lies in determining the reliability of each intuition in an individual sense. Therefore, they should each be scrutinized and treated with skepticism until it can be proven that they are objectively valid. In addition, situations will arise in which our intuitions conflict. How do we go about resolving such controversies? Unfortunately intuitionism does not provide us with a satisfactory answer to this important question. This shows that Prichard’s conception of intuitionism is incomplete, and ultimately places an unwarranted amount of emphasis on the ability of our intuitions by themselves to guide us towards the morally correct course of action.
Conclusion: Our Intuitions Should be Regarded as One Factor Among Many
Although I disagree with the intuitionists’ assertion that no other factors besides our intuitions can serve to guide us in our moral deliberations, I still hold that our intuitions do play an important role in influencing our moral judgments. “It is hard to see how to justify any substantive moral view without appealing to some moral intuition at some point” (Sinnott-Armstrong 306). When pursuing a moral course of action, we are undoubtedly guided by our fundamental notions of right and wrong at least to some extent. This begs the question, just how significant a role do our intuitions play in guiding our moral judgments? While it is impossible to answer this question through empirical determinations, I will try here to briefly outline how I view the moral decision making process.
As previously stated, by no means do moral intuitions constitute the only relevant consideration to be taken into account when designing a moral theory. A theory which focused only on our intuitions would be unable to contribute to the resolution of numerous normative disputes. When dealing with cases involving a contested moral rule, we need to appeal to a source other than our intuitions in order for any tangible progress to be made. For example, consider the scenario I presented at the beginning of this paper. Euthanasia is a very complex and divisive moral controversy. On one hand, opponents of euthanasia argue that it is never permissible to take a life, while on the other hand, proponents assert that in limited circumstances it is permissible, if not obligatory, to relieve a person of unnecessary pain and suffering. This controversy will never be solved solely by appeal to intuitions, due to the fact that the disagreement between the two groups stems from fundamental differences about the value of life. In other words, arguing based only on our intuitions will ultimately get us no closer to resolving this important controversy. Instead, we need to appeal to moral principles in order to prove to our opponents the error of their ways. As an illustration of this, the proponents of limited assisted suicide could appeal to the harm principle to assert that no one would be harmed through the assisted suicide procedure. In fact, from a utilitarian perspective, it could be argued that our goal is to decrease the general pain to the greatest extent possible, and thus it is obligatory for us to put a terminally ill person out of his misery. Therefore, it is clear that although an appeal to ethical principles may not ultimately settle a controversial debate, it at least provides us with an opportunity for a resolution to be reached.
We can conclude from this discussion that an adequate moral theory must be comprehensive in order to account for the endless variations that present themselves during our moral deliberations. One such approach is known as reflective equilibrium. According to Jeff McMahan’s conception of reflective equilibrium, we begin with a set of moral intuitions about particular acts, filter out those that are clearly results of distorting influences, and then seek to unify the remaining influences under a set of general principles (McMahan 100). The main advantage of this approach is that it serves to enhance the credibility of our intuitions by an independent appeal to principles. In other words, our goal is to arrive at an acceptable coherence among our beliefs and principles. Unlike Prichard’s foundational approach to morality, this approach holds that both our intuitions and are theories are open to revision (Daniels 2). Contrary to Prichard, McMahan treats intuitions as evidence to support our beliefs, rather than self-justifying foundational blocks. Under this approach, we continue to tweak both our theories and intuitions until we reach an optimal level of credibility.
Another strength of this approach is in its consistency. “According to coherentism, the principle will provide no more than token support for the intuition unless it is itself well integrated within a larger network of mutually coherent beliefs” (McMahan 103). McMahan articulates that principles must be tested for consistency with other moral beliefs, in order to enhance their credibility. The convergence between an intuition and a more general principle undoubtedly represents a more legitimate moral judgment than appeal to the intuition alone. Furthermore, I propose that reflective equilibrium could be supplemented through the addition of a mechanism for ranking individual intuitions based on their reliability. Although this can not be done in an empirical manner, we could at least attempt to observe the extent to which our intuitions cohere with generally accepted philosophical principles about how to act. One criterion which we could use in order to evaluate our intuitions would be to attempt to determine on an individual basis during which era each one was established. The older the moral intuition, the more likely we should be inclined to view the moral judgment with skepticism. The reason for viewing these older judgments with increased skepticism is that they are more likely than newer intuitions to have been distorted by external influences over time. However, this does not mean we should simply abandon many of our suspect previous moral intuitions: instead, we should attempt to test them in contemporary real world situations in order to determine if they are still reliable in today’s day and age. Thus, while intuitions may serve to influence our moral deliberations, by themselves they are unable to contribute much to the resolution of normative ethical debates. However, if we combine the influence of our intuitions with that of other independent sources of confirmation such as philosophical principles, we could successfully create a moral theory which adequately serves to explain our moral judgments.
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